Fundamentalist mindset

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Introduction

A certain worry must have been present when the congress committee invited to reflect on fundaments and in connection with this, fundamentalism. Fundaments, as is stated in the invitation, is “a necessary minimum, to which further elaboration may or may not be added. Something that is fundamental to something else is essential to it” (Oxford Thesaurus). A permanent question in our profession is what may function as fundamental or essential, without which it will not be psychoanalysis?

Psychoanalysis developed in the last century into a diverse field with several schools and traditions, all with their own language or dialect, often with quite diverse and at times idiosyncratic understanding of central concepts. In a conceptual research on selected concepts, enactment and unconscious phantasy, it was at times difficult to discern the fundamentals across different schools (Bohleber et al., 2015, Bohleber et al., 2013). It was also amazing to observe to what degree different schools did not cite each other, confirming an impression of tribalism, a core mark of fundamentalism.

Controversies have sometimes led to splitting of psychoanalytic groups. These splits are certainly multi-determined, where personal animosity, institutional rivalry, ideological forces from without and societal conditions play a role alongside theoretical controversies. Having observed some of them have increased my respect for unconscious forces that develop on a group level. Primitive defences like splitting and projective identifications, idealisation and mere denial has prevailed in spite of presumably solid psychoanalytic training and thorough personal analysis. In the heat of the battles the ability for rational argument and mentalising tend to get lost – and this condition may prevail for such a long time that the history of the original conflict and split may almost be forgotten.

Heated debates and severe antagonisms are of course not particular for psychoanalysis and can be seen in many professions. During my time in

psychoanalysis and IPA there has certainly been an improvement of the intellectual debate, but still arguments flourish that deem other positions as dangerous or damaging to psychoanalysis.

Research is a case of matter here. There has, as we know, been a long struggle to get acceptance for formal research in psychoanalysis and there are clear regional and other differences regarding the value or even the potential damage ascribed to research.

One example: there is quit solid research showing that transference interpretations are quite useful for patients with more severe personality pathologies, but less important for neurotic disturbances. They should be used with caution also for personality disturbances and researchers came up with the advice that not more than 1-4 interpretations per session is to be recommended (Høglend, 2014). Clinicians may dismiss this finding as it is expressed in a mechanistic, formal scientific language and would certainly not fit with psychoanalytic approaches focusing on the here-and-now of the patient-analyst relationship. The clinician's difficulties with empirical research are, however, in my view related to a problem of language; clinical psychoanalysis and empirical research are expressed in quite different languages and difficulties and even unwillingness to learn the other group's language. Shahar distinguishes in this connection psychoanalysis as the language of poetics from research as a schematic language (Shahar, 2010). Either language, or dialect, is useful in relation to their respective domains and valid in relations to its objects of study but they do not communicate very well. Should I, as clinician, start to count transference interpretations in each session? I think this type of concrete perception of insights expressed in "the other's language" has been an important impediment to reciprocal understanding and also to the development in the each fields of inquiry.

This may an example of shielding oneself from being influenced by "the other" or from something outside, one of the salient figures in to which I will return later.

The question in the back of the mind of the congress committee may then be to what degree psychoanalytic societies and institutions as well as its members are prone to be caught in the lures of fundamentalist attitudes or, as I will call it, fundamentalist states of mind or mindset. These are states of mind

that avoids ambiguity, deplores diversity with a more or less prominent tendency to manichaeistic thinking (a dualistic cosmology describing the struggle between a good, spiritual world of light, and an evil, material world of darkness).

It can be argued that such states of mind develop within basic-assumption groups (Bion, 1961) and as such is a danger in every group formation and group process. Fundamentalism is then a symptom of anxiety for the group's cohesion and an ideology that advocates adherence to fundamentals will be an illusory way to safeguard the group.

This general view may count for all kinds of fundamentalist tendencies in groups. Fundamentalism is a question of degrees and may be related to certain phases in groups' ongoing processes, and the group may then turn back to more normal business of rational argumentation. I will argue, however, that there are situations that we may call the fundamentalist trap, that are not always easy to identify and that may have devastating influences on a group or an organization's development. It is reason to believe that this may develop in any group – also psychoanalytic. In other words, when keeping the fundamentals in mind, the danger is that this may develop belief in fundamentals, and as any belief, it may not be questioned. The fundamentalist trap is a situation where fundamentals cannot b questioned. The following characterizes these situations:

A conviction that someone has deviated from the essentials, that they are absolutely wrong, that the influences from them will shake the fundaments and harm the cohesion of the group, accompanied by a predominance of dualistic thinking and lack of rational argumentation.

Having thus stated that fundamentalism is an inherent possibility also on the psychoanalytic scene, I will in the following discuss fundamentalism on a quite different scene, but maybe close enough, namely as it appears in political and religious movements, especially present Islamist movements - and on the basis of this, discuss the relation between fundaments and fundamentalism. Islamist fundamentalism is condemned from a western democratic point of view as evil forces. There are serious attempts to connect this type of thinking to Islam, as something inherent in this religion, that is, it belongs to the other.

Fundamentalism and fundamentalist mindset

The concept **mindset** denotes a set of assumptions held by individuals and groups that create a powerful incentive for choices and behaviours and that are slowly changing, bound up with identities and subject to a kind of mental inertia. It is first and foremost group thinking and can be aligned with a "Weltanschauung". **Fundamentalist mindset** is characterised by dualistic thinking, paranoia and rage in a group context, an apocalyptic orientation that implies a distinct view on time, death and violence, a dependence on charismatic leaders and an idea of a totalised conversion (Strozier and Boyd, 2010).

Fundamentalism as a discourse represents rigid adherence to basic principles in line with the origin of the fundamentalism among British and American Protestants in late 19th and early 20 century. This was a peaceful movement that feared changes within the Christian community. Fundamentalism is now, however, mostly connected with a special interpretation of Islam and the relation to religious inspired violence is often fore fronted.

Fundamentalism understood as rigid adherence to basic principles, exists in all religions, in political movements, in institutions of different kinds and is possible to discern in scientific and professional debates. Fundamentalist mindset is something that usually develops within the context of a fundamentalist movement, but where the ideological aspect may be underdeveloped and the psychological side become more dominant.

When Strozier and Boyd associate fundamentalist mindset with paranoia and rage and an apocalyptic orientation, they underline the inherent or latent danger of violence in fundamentalism. Fundamentalism does not, however, necessarily imply violence. In fact, most people we call fundamentalists today are not violent and tries to pursue their goals by peaceful means, be it the wish to create a state ruled by Sharia or a Christian community. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is an example.

Discussing Islam one must therefore differentiate between Islamic fundamentalists who pursue goals by persuasion and preaching from what is called **"Jihadists"** who believe that violence is the most important way to change matters. Among Jihadists one must again distinguish between

nationalist or patriotic jihadists and what may be called global or transnational Jihadists. The former appear in local contexts with an aim of liberating their group from oppression. Some Palestinian and Chechen groups belongs here as well as several other groups in the Middle East and Asian region (Khosrokhavar, 2010). The latter, the global Jihadists, are organised more or less as global organisations, are extremely violent, are totally occupied by a purist version of their belief and are indiscriminate in their violent attacks against people they deem as non-believers and outsiders.

There are thus a variety of groups and types of organisation with different aims and motives and different means to achieve their aims that is connected with what we call fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is not something bad I itself. Many have found peace in a fundamentalist conviction or belief, salvage from their inner torments and conflicts, which made it possible for them to lead a more harmonious life.

The question posed by this conference is, however, whether adherence to fundaments and what we today see as fundamentalism has any necessary or logical connection?

Or to put it another way: do fundamentalism basically concerns the fundaments of a religion, a political ideology, a scientific discourse? And in connection with this: is there a logical connection between fundamentalism and Jihadism or other extremely violent and mass killing politico-religious movements? Is fundamentalism the problem or do we need to contextualise this and look at multiple determinations and for example study the influence of historical, societal processes and unconscious processes in groups and individuals?

Fundamentalism in history

Fundamentalism is not only seen in religious movements and fundamentalism leading to violence has a long history. Nazism and Stalinism being prime examples in the last century. The genocides of the last century was much more violent and deadly than today's Jihadism: the genocide on the Armenians, on Jews and Roma people, the Kampuchean genocide, the genocide on the Maya Indians in Guatemala, the Rwandan genocide and the genocide on Bosnians, to mention the most important. It is interesting that present Jihadic violence has created much more public attention, much more

analysis and political concerns in the west than most of the genocides in the last century with the exception of the Holocaust. This is certainly connected with the global aspiration of one fraction of the Jihadist movement, a global ambition quite similar to the Nazis' dream of the third Reich.
The meaning of Jihad as it appears in the west is also worth noticing. In Islam Jihad has several meaning, the most important being the internal fight to free oneself from bad thoughts/feelings, a sort of inner purification (Vogt, 1993). There has been a kind of co-production between western anti-Islamism and the radicalisation in Islam that ended with designating the outward, violent Jihad as almost the only known meaning of Jihad in the west. The concept of inner religious struggle is quite similar to the same in Christianity and other religions.
The radical version of Jihad may serve purposes on both sides. It inspires maximization of differences; a dualistic thinking that makes the other the bad other and lay ground for a reciprocal need to demonise the other. This has historical background in western relation to the orient, to which I will return. One part of this picture is the movement of fright in Europe that is stirring group anxieties of being invaded by something bad. Different consequences follow from this among others the extreme dehumanising practices we can observe at Europe's borders and also in the growing xenophobia I Europe.

Islamism and xenophobia; suitable partners?

While xenophobia refers to a phobic attitude towards strangers or the unknown, that is; psychological attitudes, embedded in a more loosely organised network of ideas, of a person or groups of persons, Islamism refers to a set of political ideologies based on the religious fundamentalist Islam. It represents an ideological-religious view of the world and how one should live and organize society.
Common to both phenomena are, however, a hostile attitude towards those who are outside, the strangers, and a fear of being negatively influenced. Both phenomena are characteristic of social movements that can result in hostility and also violence against those defined as "others", "strangers" or, in the case of Islamism, "non believers". Especially the Jihadist version of Islamic

fundamentalism includes an expansionistic view; the different other should change or else be driven away, extinguished or cleansed. It is noteworthy that similar ideas also appear in the European xenophobic context.

These are ideological large group processes that have a potential for violence. Ideologies based on xenophobia (e.g. racism) and Islamism appeal to collective fantasies that have deep roots in the way groups functions, and these fantasy constructions are related to certain developmental phases, especially adolescence (Bohleber, 2010).

The mental functioning involved is characterized by primitive and undifferentiated explanations of relations between self, group and the other, as formulated in the theory of mindset (Strozier et al., 2010). The collective fantasies seek solutions to or modifications of individual's and group's frustrations and material problems.

Ideologies function as containers for these fantasies and give them shape and a place in the social order. The implicit, and often, explicit content of these extreme ideologies have a fantasy-like form that is appealing exactly because they "touch" the individuals' and group's feelings (longings, aggressions etc.) as they are expressed in the shared fantasies. The promise of ideal solutions in these ideologies, such as the ideal future society, meets the regressive pull in these fantasies and makes it easier for disenfranchised individuals to join.

Fantasies are collective in the sense that many individuals in the same group share them. Political narratives, exegeses of religious myths or other ideological myths contain narratives that appeal to and are congruent with such collective fantasies. When they are implicit they function as a non-conscious force that to a lesser degree is available for reflection and change and may appear as given truths.

The relational scenarios embedded in these fantasies are often related to the group's historical experiences, especially centred around present and past traumas, and may give meaning to actual and recent problematic experiences for the group and their individuals. An example was the myth of the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1392 where the Ottomans supposedly killed King Lazar and conquered Balkan territories, which was used by Milosevic as justifications for attacks on Bosnian Muslims (Volkan, 1997). In certain Islamic fundamentalist theory, the fall of the Caliphate plays a similar role.

The versions of history given need not cohere with the facts and there are displacements of affectionate cathexis from other historical times. The effects of massive intergroup violence and traumatisation during Second World War in the Balkans probably found expression in the ancient historical myth on Kosovo Polje as it in that context were possible to identify a suitable enemy. One may then see a mixture of myths and historical facts in such situations where the lack of working through on a societal level of these groups' traumatisation laid the ground for emergence of tensions and conflict between groups.

In conflicts with high tensions on both sides, there are interpersonal and inter-group processes that are determined by unconscious motivation and expressed in strong interpersonal and inter-group psychological forces. The parties in a conflict may act irrationally and against conscious intentions. As a result of being demonised by the other party members of the group may act in the image of the projected demons and behave in ways alien to their own ethical and political standards.

In conflicts opponents are thus cast in roles and positions that not necessarily are part of ones own world-view or maybe only partly so, but remain part of the others view of the world and the other's agenda. The opponents may in such situations be highly dependent on each other in order to have their worldview confirmed. The religious inspired dialogue between President Bush and Osama bin Laden after 9/11 was an example where both cast the other in the position as representing the evil forces thus confirming each others' religious position: this is a conflict between the bad and the good. This again prepared for escalation of conflict and violence.

The development of fundamentalist mindset in its violent form is thus also a result of inter-group processes, a co-creation, rather than only a disposition in one or the other group's members.

Psychoanalysis and groups

Conflicts involving groups are arenas for primitive mental forces; reciprocal projections and massive projective identifications, that is, the party who projects makes a pressure (interpersonal, inter-group) to get the other to act

in accordance with a fantasized scenario, which often involves distribution of roles as the good or the bad, victim or perpetrator (Klein, 1946).
The following picture emerges:

1. Political, religious and other intergroup conflicts with violent tendencies are to a large extent determined by unconscious mental forces acting both on an individual and a group level.

2. The unconscious motivational forces are organised on primitive mental levels (undifferentiated and not well structured) and involve fantasies that may be shared by many people in a group or community.

3. The content of these fantasies are often related to common life themes such as sibling rivalry, struggle to distinguish between what is good and bad, themes related to separation and individuation. That is; life themes that under normal circumstances are worked through and more or less overcome, may be magnified and made part of the group's collective consciousness (Bohleber, 2010). Related to sibling rivalry one may see different themes become a preconscious or unconscious part of a group's mentality: "the other got more than I, he was treated favourably or he even cheated in order to get advantages". When these common fantasy themes are organised by a political-religious ideology, they can develop into an emotional force supporting these ideologies. An example is the xenophobic ideation on how the foreigners "steal our jobs and fuck our women".

4. The collective memory of groups and nations of past traumatisation and humiliations may also determine fantasies of a more violent kind concerned with revenge and rectification of wrongdoings. This may add a more severe and destructive character to these fantasies.

5. Cultural, political and religious ideologies and discourses may inspire individual and collective fantasies by giving form and content to pains and frustrations for example in defining the guilty, the enemy etc. The ideologies and political rhetoric may, however, also be projection screens for the individual's and the groups fantasies which then in turn take on a more violent character marked by primitive mechanisms such as splitting and projections, scapegoating, dehumanisation of the others and so forth. Such ideologies may thus organise a group's identity and supply identity themes for the individual in regressed mass-psychological situations.

5. The collective fantasies represent in themselves strong emotional/psychological forces. When they are organised within a context of political-religious ideologies, they may become social forces determining the way conflicts are solved or not solved and have influence on whether the crisis escalates or not.

I will relate these propositions shortly to Islamic fundamentalism and xenophobia in the European context.

Europe and Islam

Islam is part of the European religious and cultural context, that is, the specific xenophobia characteristic of European's relation to Islam, Islamophobia is, as with any other xenophobia, a matter of relations within the European community. The tension between western culture and Islam or Islamism does not represent a clash between civilisations but rather social and historical conflicts as well as internal conflicts and contradictions within Islam (also in Europe).

Meddeb, an Arabic intellectual and Muslim, describes the present Islamic fundamentalism, as a result of "The malady of Islam", that is; an overall intellectual deterioration within Islam, where ideologies alien to the intentions within the Quran and the corpus of texts that represents the intentions of the Quran, are used for political purposes that has more to do with the cohesion of the group, the Umma, than with developmental possibilities within Islam (Meddeb, 2003). According to this view, we are dealing with tensions, not between them and us, Islam and the west but the basic question concerns rather a contradiction between modernism and traditionalism, a theme that has been important in the west especially in relation to National Socialism and earlier in relation to "anti-enlightenment and anti-modernistic movements.

Europe's relation to Islam has a long history of scepticism and fear reaching back in medieval times. There has been an attitude towards Islam marked by projections of aggression and mysticism. "For a very long time the Christian West perceived the Muslims as a danger before they became a problem", remarked the historian Maxine Rodinson (cited in (Geisser, 2004) p. 38). In mediaeval times Europe needed, according to this line of reasoning, a

common enemy in the process of achieving its religious and ideological unity. An image of this medieval enemy picture was reinvented and emerged and achieved special political force during the ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkan war in the nineties.

After a period of enlightened interest in Islam in the 17th and 18th century where the picture of Islam emerged as exemplary of tolerance, moderation and open-mindedness, a fearful picture of Islam that involved danger and threat to western values, again emerged in the 19th century. The traditional theological consideration (Jihad vs. Crusaders) and the need to protect and unify the Christian identity prevailed as a trend. In the last century, a more "modern" and maybe stronger Islamophobia emerged in different parts of Europe especially with the increase of Muslim communities in Europe. According to the European Monitoring centre on Racism and Xenophobia this new Islamophobia is characterised by increased physical and other forms of violence, anxiety and hostility with some right wing parties using the fear of Islam for populist purposes (Crickley, 2006).

There is an obvious confusion regarding differences and nuances in Islam and vulnerable refugee groups easily become prey to prejudices and unnecessary restrictions in this context[1]. European Islamophobia has gained strength from the development of Islamic fundamentalism. In its extreme forms, as for example advocated in the writings of Qutb of The Muslim Brotherhood, the west, especially the city-culture, is portrayed as a sinful place with corrupt people only hungering for wealth and pleasure (Heine, 2002, Laqueur, 2001, Serauky, 2000). The Islamic state governed by Sharia is, on the other hand, portrayed as the ideal way of organising society, a place where all needs are satisfied etc. Based on a fundamentalist reading of the Qur'an, this rhetoric claims that Islamic law shall "triumph on the scale of all humanity for such law is considered the ultimate expression of divine truth", (Meddeb 2003, p. 157). Taken in its extreme, which some Islamist groups do,

[1] Concomitantly there is also desire for dialogue. The European Monitoring Centre notice marked differences regarding manifest xenophobia, violence against minorities in different countries. The Netherlands and Denmark are earmarked as countries where the conditions have deteriorated the last years. It is interesting to note that more radical violent versions of Islam are present in Denmark but not too any significant extent in Norway, possibly as a result of a longstanding, officially sponsored dialogues between Muslim and Christian organisations.

this implies the horrifying possibility of wiping out, or incorporating, all those who will not accept this “divine truth”.

Antimodernism and Europe

The present conflict with Islam in the European context masks a conflict or tension between modernism and anti-modernism, Bohleber argues that antimodernism has long roots in European culture and he points at similarities between basic ideological claims and fantasies in the Nazi ideology and Jihadist ideology: a myth of an ideal past, an utopian dream of the perfect society, defence against threat from without (from modernism and western influence) and a death cult (Bohleber, 2002). There is further in both ideologies a preoccupation with purity and blood, the development of a sense of entitlement and a concomitant glorification of victimhood and martyrdom (Buruma, 2004, Volkan, 2003).

For Islamic fundamentalism as well as for the Nazi ideology, although in a different shape, one could add the subordination of women (and the distaste for women liberation) and the total rejection of homosexuality (Varvin, 2003). Burma and Margalit further argue that the image of Islam in Europe is heavily coloured by antimodernism as it appeared historically in the European context. One may say that the European image of Islam is coloured by Europe’s “repressed” antimodernism. This is then taken over by fundamentalist Islam and finds its representation there[23]. The antimodernism in Islamist movements has thus inspiration and roots in ideologies of European origin and this “Islamic antimodernism” may, from the European perspective, be seen as the uncanny return of the collectively repressed.

Collective fantasies

Embedded in these ideological claims are collective fantasies of cohesion of the group, of purification and cleansing of the unwanted, dirty, of sacrifice and

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[2] Historically antimodernism was represented in German romanticism in opposition to French cultural and political dominance, which defined modernism at the time. These views were accepted by antimodernist movements in Russia and in Slavic countries and became later embraced by central fundamentalist Muslim ideologists.

[3] The influence was also direct. In Qutb’s writing the French Nobel Prize winner in medicine Alexis Carrel who wrote notoriously on racism and euthanasia was frequently cited.

scapegoats. Women are in fundamentalist Islam seen as both sexually provocative and dirty and have to be controlled. In Nazi ideology, women were to a certain degree idealised but nonetheless controlled, which is the other side of the same coin. Furthermore, there are fantasies of melting together with the almighty aim of the whole group and, in the case of sacrifice and martyrdom, unification with God in paradise. Ruth Stein in her analysis of Atta one of the terrorists of 9/11, called this vertical desire for God, a homoerotic bond to the almighty (Stein, 2006).
The Islamophobic and xenophobic fantasies are more unorganised but represent deep currents in European culture.

Adolescence and fundamentalism

Bohleber claim that these fundamentalist fantasies are concordant with mental processes in late adolescence (Bohleber, 2002). Identity seeking and identity problems and a tendency to regressively adhere to group norms are characteristic for this period in life. The need to find representatives for ego ideals other than those of the parents together with the need to split-off unwanted, shameful aspects of the self may ease adherence to totalitarian groups with charismatic leaders. In traditional Islamic societies the group, clan and family plays a more important role than in western culture. Man belongs to the Umma, comprising all Muslim or rather all “humanity”. The late adolescence process may therefore be different in this context in that belonging to the greater family of Muslims, rather than a drive towards individualism, may become the aim of becoming grown-up. The main task for boys or young men in the Islamic context is the transition from being a son in the family to being head of ones own family. For women this often means transition from subordination under father to the same under the husband. For this transition to happen certain societal condition must be present first and foremost the ability to bring income to the family.
The very high unemployment rate in Muslim countries and among Muslims in the European context makes the transition to manhood/womanhood difficult and sometimes filled with impossible dilemmas for young Muslims (Herzinger, Schuh, & Nieuwenhuizen, 2002). The material conditions to fulfil the cultural tasks are not available and one can see a prolonged late adolescence full of

material and instinctual frustration. This situation represents fertile ground for ideologies that have “secure” explanations and promises solutions to frustrations. At present, fundamentalist ideologies with their tendency to place the guilt on others and thus support a passive-aggressive attitude seems to be a tempting alternative for many young Muslims.

There are striking similarities between ideologies of Islamist groups and right-wing vigilante groups and it is also significant that Islamophobia and xenophobia is highly represented in the younger generations in Europe and markedly in groups marginal to the labour market. A study of German youth during the nineties showed furthermore that xenophobic attitudes in these marginalised groups were established often in early adolescence and did not change significantly in the next ten years or so (Boehnke, 1998).

How to become a killer?

Religious-political ideologies offer solutions to frustrations on individual and group level. They not only organise the group’s way of thinking but they also organise the inner mental space of the individual and influence unconscious processes on a group level. That is; they contribute to the formation of the group’s and the individual’s identity and give motivation for action and also long-term strategies. Collective fantasies and ideologies are structured as relational scenarios; there are agonists and protagonist in a drama involving projective processes. At this primitive level, an important aim is to avoid unwanted aspects of self, get rid of guilt and a need to portray the other as dirty, sinful and so forth.

The development of a jihadist or terrorist fundamentalist mindset where one is prepared to kill for the sake of the “good”, goes somewhere beyond these theorizations. There are certain processes that make the ordinary man a killer that happens beyond the ideological level and even beyond most known mental processes. Browning’s study of the ordinary men of the Hamburg police battalion who willingly engaged in savage murdering in the eastern part of Europe during Nazi occupation testifies to this (Browning, 1998). The Norwegian mass murderer Breivik’s testimony on the difficulties he had with first murder, and how easy it was afterwards, testifies to an inherent primitive process in the mere act of killing (Varvin, 2012). Reports from killings in

concentrations camps during the Balkan war revealed how killing could be an escape from remorse and guilt in that the suffering victim became the representative of primitive guilt, which thus, magically, could be removed by exterminating him (Varvin, 2001). The willingness to kill or the act of killing contains a complex dynamics that cannot be subsumed only under a theory of the fundamentalist mindset. Time does not allow discussing this further.

Conclusion

I am not sure I have come further in the understanding of how adherence to fundamentals develop into fundamentalism and what relevance this may have for psychoanalysis. I hope, however, that I have shown how psychoanalytic insights may shed light on the development into this special kind of group-ism and how this is deeply related to the difficulties in relating to others and otherness.

In Freud's work on Moses and Monotheism (Freud, 1939) the central, and controversial, claim was that the founder of Judaism was an Egyptian, that is; one from the outside, Moreover, the Jews killed Moses, their leader. An act of murder became constitutive of the social tie. As Jacqueline Rose states: " .. there is no sociality without violence, that people are most powerfully and effectively united by what they agree to hate. What binds the people to each other and to their God is that they killed him" (cited in (Said, 2003), p 75).

We live in a time where fundamentalism is growing. This shows among others in the precarious balance in Europe today regarding the relation to Muslim groups. While most Muslims live a peaceful and adjusted life, the general public's image of Muslims is more and more characterised by solid prejudices (Islam cannot adapt, Muslims support, terror, Islam is violent political ideology etc.), restrictions and increasingly harsh conditions for refugees (often identified as potentially violent Muslims). Under the cover of the war against terrorism, surveillance and other law-enforcement measures are directed against foreigners.

In short – fright of the alien and thus xenophobia, is increasing and resulting in what Liz Fekete calls xeno-racism; a hostile and discriminating attitude towards foreigners (Fekete, 2009) and reciprocal interdependent fundamentalism flourish.

Psychoanalysis should represent a counterbalancing force in this context.

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